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Shapiro, et al., v. Welt, et al., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 6 (February 2, 2017)1 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: VAGUENESS; STRATEGIC LAWSUITS  
AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
PRIVILEGES: ABSOLUTE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE 
 
 
Summary 
 The court considered consolidated appeals and a cross-appeal from a district court order 
granting a motion to dismiss complaint based on anti-SLAPP statutes and the awarding of 
attorney fees and costs. The Court considered whether parts of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, 
NRS 41.637, are unconstitutionally vague, whether statements made in relation to a 
conservatorship action constitute an issue of public interest under NRS 41.637(4), and whether 
those statements fall within the scope of the absolute litigation privilege. The Court found that 
no, NRS 41.637 is not unconstitutionally vague; adopted a California test for determining an 
issue of public interest–and remanded the present case for further proceedings; and found that the 
district court did not conduct the specific, fact-intensive inquiry it needed to for the absolute 
litigation privilege, and accordingly reversed the district court’s order in part, and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. 
 
Background 
 Appellant Howard Shapiro petitioned a New Jersey court to appoint him as conservator 
for his father, Walter Shapiro. Respondents Glen Welt, Rhoda Welt, Lynn Welt, and Michelle 
Welt opposed the petition. Over the course of that action, Howard received an email from Glen 
stating that Howard’s “actions have been deemed worthy of [his] own website” and stating Glen 
was “personally inviting EVERY one of [Howard’s] known victims to appear in court along with 
other caretakers, neighbors[,] acquaintances[,] and relatives [Howard] threatened.”2 Thereafter, 
the Welts published a website that contained Howard’s personal information as well as multiple 
allegations about Howard’s past debts, criminal history, and alleged mistreatment of his father. 
The website stated that is was “dedicated to helping victims” of Howard, warning others of him, 
and encouraging anyone “with knowledge of Howard A. Shapiro’s actions against Walter 
Shapiro or other illegal acts committed by Howard Shapiro . . . to appear in court.”3 
 Howard and Jenna Shapiro then filed a complaint in Nevada alleging various causes of 
action regarding the Welts’ statements on the website including defamation per se, defamation, 
extortion, civil conspiracy, and fraud. The Welts then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to NRS 
41.660, Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the website constituted a good-faith 
communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of 
public concern pursuant to NRS 41.637. Specifically, the Welts argued the statements were 
protected as statements made in direct connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial 
body and as communications made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a 
public forum. 
 The district court issued an order granting the Welts’ motion to dismiss finding that the 
website was a “communication regarding an ongoing lawsuit concerning the rights of an elderly 
                                                     
1 By Stephanie Glantz. 
2 Shapiro v. Welt, 133 Nev., Adv. Op. 6, *3 (2016). 
3 Id. 
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individual, and as a matter of public concern under NRS 41.637(4).” Additionally, the district 
court found the Shapiros failed to show a probability they would prevail on the lawsuit–
concluding that the Welts’ statements would likely be protected by the absolute litigation 
privilege. Subsequently, the district court issued an order granting the Welts’ attorney fees, but 
failed to explicitly address the Welts’ request for an additional award pursuant to NRS 
41.670(1)(b). Thereafter, the Shapiros timely appealed the motion to dismiss, and the Welts 
cross-appealed the part of the district court’s order denying an additional award pursuant to NRS 
41.670(1)(b). 
 
Discussion 
 
I. Standard of Review 
 
 The court reviews the constitutionality of a statute and cannons of statutory construction 
de novo.4 But, the court provides greater deference to the lower court’s findings of fact on a 
motion to dismiss and therefore reviews those for abuse of discretion. 
 
II. Vagueness of NRS 41.637 
 
 The Shapiros argued that NRS 41.637 is unconstitutionally vague because the term “good 
faith” and the phrase “without knowledge of its falsehood” are both vague and inherently 
contradictory. Although they did not raise this issue in the district court, the Court exercised their 
discretion to review the issue for the first time on appeal and found NRS 41.637 is not 
unconstitutionally vague. 
 A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it “(1) fails to provide a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice of what [conduct] is prohibited; or (2) if it is so standardless that it 
authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”5 The Court concluded that the 
term “good faith” does not operate independently within the statute. Instead, it is part of the 
phrase “good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free 
speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.” This phrase is explicitly defined in 
the statute. Further, the Court concluded the phrase “made without knowledge of falsehood” has 
a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning–the declarant must be unaware that the 
communication is false at the time it was made. Thus, the Court concluded the statute provides 
notice to a person of ordinary intelligence exactly what conduct is prohibited, and accordingly is 
not unconstitutionally vague. 
 
III. Anti-SLAPP litigation 
 
In Nevada, a defendant may file a special motion to dismiss if the defendant can show 
“by preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faith communication in 
furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of 
public concern.”6 Once the defendant shows this, the burden switches to the plaintiff to show a 
                                                     
4 See Zohar v. Zbiegien, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 74, 334 P.3d 402, 405 (2014).  
5 State v. Casteneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481, 245 P.3d 550, 552 (2010). 
6 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(a). 
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probability of prevailing on the claim.7 The Shapiros challenged that the Welts met their initial 
burden, and that the Shapiros failed to meet theirs because the Welts’ statements are protected by 
the absolute litigation privilege. 
 
A. Issue of Public Interest 
 
The Shapiros argued that the district court erred in granting the Welts’ special motion to 
dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.660 due to an improper analysis of whether the conservatorship 
action is an issue of public interest under NRS 41.637(4), and the Court agreed. 
Prior to the present action, Nevada had not determined what constitutes “an issue of 
public interest” in the anti-SLAPP context. However, the Court took this opportunity to adopt 
California’s guiding principles, as enunciated in Piping Rock Partners. There, the court noted: 
(1) “public interest” does not equate with mere curiosity; 
(2) a matter of public interest should be something of concern to a substantial 
number of people; a matter of concern to a speaker and a relatively small specific 
audience is not a matter of public interest; 
(3) there should be some degree of closeness between the challenged 
statements and the asserted public interest–the assertion of a broad and 
amorphous public interest is not sufficient; 
(4) the focus of the speaker’s conduct should be the public interest rather than 
a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of private controversy; and 
(5) a person cannot turn otherwise private information into a matter of public 
interest simply by communicating it to a large number of people8 
 
Since the district court did not apply the Piping Rock Partners principles in its analysis of 
the Welts’ statements, the Court reversed the order and remanded it for further proceedings–
instructing the district court to apply the Piping Rock Partners principles. 
 
B. Absolute Litigation Privilege 
 
The Shapiros argued that the district court erred in applying the absolute litigation 
privilege test articulated in Jacobs v. Adelson9, and the Court agreed. The Jacobs test requires 
that: “(1) a judicial proceeding must be contemplated in good faith and under serious 
consideration, and (2) the communication must be related to the litigation.”10 However, 
statements made to someone not directly involved in the judicial proceeding is only covered if 
the “recipient of the communication is significantly interested in the proceeding.”11 Further, to 
determine if someone is “significantly interested in the proceeding,” the court must make a case-
specific, fact-intensive inquiry, into the recipient’s legal relationship to the litigation, not their 
interest as an observer.12 Since the district court did not conduct a case-specific, fact-intensive 
inquiry that focused on and balanced the underlying principles of the privilege as required by 
                                                     
7 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660(3)(b). 
8 Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner Assocs., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing 
Weinberg v. Feisel, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 392–93 (Ct. App. 2003), aff’d, 609 F. App’x 497 (9th Cir. 2015). 
9 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 44, 325 P.3d 1282 (2014). 
10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
11 Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428, 436, 49 P.3d 640, 645–46 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
12 Jacobs, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 44, 325 P.3d at 1287.  
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Jacobs, the Court found that the lower court erred in its finding, and accordingly remanded for 
further proceedings. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The district court erred in its analysis of whether the Welts’ statements concerned an 
issue of public interest, and explicitly adopted the California guidelines, enumerated in Piping 
Rock Partners, for determining whether an issue is of public interest under NRS 41.637(4). 
Additionally, the district court failed to conduct a case-specific, fact-intensive inquiry that 
focused on and balanced the Jacobs principles of the absolute litigation privilege. Thus, the 
Court reversed, in part, the district court’s order granting the Welts’ special motion to dismiss 
pursuant to NRS 41.660, and remanded it for further proceedings. 
 Additionally, the Court affirmed the part of the district court’s order denying an award 
under NRS 41.660(1)(b), and finally, vacated the district court’s order of attorney fees because 
the district court will conduct further proceedings on this matter. 
